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Abstract. This paper investigates contagion in international credit markets through the use of a 
novel jump detection technique proposed by Chan and Maheuin (2002). This econometrical 
methodology is preferred because it is non-linear by definition and not a subject to volatility bias. 
Also, the identified jumps in CDS premiums are considered as outliers positioned beyond any 
stochastic movement that can and is already modelled through well-known linear analysis. 
Though contagion is hard to define, we show that extreme discrete movements in default 
probabilities inferred from CDS premiums can lead to sound economic conclusions about the risk 
profile of sovereign nations in international bond markets. We find evidence of investor sentiment 
clustering for countries with unstable political regimes or that are engaged in armed conflict. 
Countries that have in their recent history faced currency or financial crises are less vulnerable 
to external unexpected shocks. First we present a brief history of sovereign defaults with an 
emphasis on their increased frequency and geographical reach, as financial markets become 
more and more integrated. We then pass to a literature review of the most important definitions 
for contagion, and discuss what quantitative methods are available to detect the presence of 
contagion. The paper continues with the details for the methodology of jump detection through 
non-linear modelling and its use in the field of contagion identification. In the last sections we 
present the estimation results for simultaneous jumps between emerging markets CDS and draw 
conclusions on the difference of behavior in times of extreme movement versus tranquil periods. 
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A brief history of sovereign defaults 
 
Sovereign debt crises and the default of city states, governments and empires 
are usual events, even with the onset of sovereign lending. The first 
historically documented default was that of the Greek temple of Delos 
(Winkler, 1933). 
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Most crises in antiquity have ended with a currency “downgrade”, both 
through inflation or devaluation and rarely through debt restructuring. This 
last type of default outcome emerged in the 16th century. In a historical 
analysis published in 2003, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano conclude that the 
states that don’t manage to pay their debts on time are plagued by a high 
degree of intolerance to external borrowing for decades and that their 
comeback is painful and slow, without the help of supranational lenders like 
the IMF or the EU. 
 
It is at the beginning of the 19th century that credit events (defined as the 
failure of a debtor to honor its contractual obligations) have become more 
frequent. This was the effect of capital transfers between financially 
independent governments, through regulated financial markets (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of credit events from the beginning of the 19’Th century  
to the present day 
Source: Carmen Reinhart and Keneth Rogoff database 
 
During the past two centuries there have been hundreds of credit events and 
debt restructuring. The reasons for this have been wars, revolutions, civil 
wars, all of these eroding the government’s capacity to repay. The suspension 
ofdebt payments to enemy countries during wars was common practice, like 
Turkey, Bulgaria and Austro-Hungary during the first world war, or Japan 
during the second world war (Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, 2006). Mexico 
(1914), Russia (1917), China (1949), Czechoslovakia (1952), and Cuba 
(1960) refused to pay their debts after the communist revolutions, decisions 
that triggered civil wars and economic collapses.  
 
The dynamics of national economic tactics and shocks to the real sector have 
become more subtle since the 19th century with the advent of new 
phenomena like regional clustering, political instability and over expansion 
in consumption followed by collapse. Lindert and Morton (1989) identify 
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behavior patterns in the lending business of exuberance followed by default 
and subsequently reduction in credit availability, a pattern that repeats itself 
during the 18th century. 
 
The impossibility of exercising coercion on debtors leads to fears and drying 
of credit to countries that have sound finances. The authors suggest that even 
if lending might be profitable in the long term, there are similar crises like 
patterns ignored by investors, despite historical documentation on them. 
Also, creditors tend to forget the payment history of governments and don’t 
penalize those that have defaulted in the past. According to economical 
historians Suter and Stamm (1992), eight boom-bust lending cycles can be 
identified starting with the 19th century, presented in the chart below.  
 
Table 1. Boom-bust lending cycles in the 19th century 
Year Countries in default 
1820's Latin 
America 
Europe        
1830's USA Spain Portugal       
1860-
1875 
Latin 
America 
USA Europe Ottoman 
Empire 
Egypt     
1880's USA Australia Latin America       
1910's Canada Australia South Africa Russia Ottoman 
Empire 
Balkan 
States 
Latin 
America 
  
1920's Germany Australia Japan Canada Argentina Brazil Cuba   
1970's Latin 
America 
Spain Yugoslavia Romania Poland Turkey Egypt Indonesia Africa 
1990's Latin 
America 
Emerging  
Asia 
Ex-communist 
countries 
      
 
 
The determinants of sovereign debt 
 
The world is continuously modeled by the accession of new political powers. 
The fall of centralized blocks like the USSR and the victory of the market 
economy made people believe that some countries will be able to impose 
their financial hegemony upon the rest of the world. If it’s China, the country 
with the biggest future GDP, or the western world, with an older population 
and a continuously rising debt, which will dominate the debt markets, 
remains to be seen (Fogel, 2010). In the United States, the collapse of the real 
estate market, coupled with a huge debt service, sustainable only through 
external borrowing, all these factors only add to the global level of systemic 
risk. 
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Figure 2. Gross debt as a percentage of gross annual GDP 
Source: The World Bank 
 
The above chart presents the level of sovereign gross debt as a percentage of 
gross annual GDP. From this point of view, Japan and Italy are the most 
indebted countries. If one would add the private debt to the sovereign one, 
then the most indebted countries would be Japan and Great Britain, at a level, 
four times higher than their annual GDP. 
 
 
Figure 3. Bar chart: Gross External Debt; Line chart: GDP per capita 
Source: IMF world outlook database 
 
Adam and Bevan (2005) studied the link between the fiscal deficit and GDP 
growth on 45 emerging economies between 1970 and 1999, using an agent 
model with overlapping generations. The authors found that the government 
deficit can generate growth if it is financed by moderate monetary mass 
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creation, or it can inhibit it if internal borrowing finances it. Their research 
also demonstrates that any increase of public spending financed by a tax 
increase can have a good effect, only if the public debt is at a low level. Saint-
Paul (1992) shows by using a neo-classical model of endogenous growth that 
an increase of the government’s public debt reduces future output for 
generations to come. Saint-Paul (1992) extends the model of Blanchard 
(1984) - economic agents with a finite time horizon, no endogenous growth 
-, assuming that there are externalities from endogenous growth, implying a 
constant rate of return on capital, at an aggregated level. 
 
In classical models, debt growth increases the welfare of the households and 
brings the economy closer to «the golden rule», that is, the level of savings 
that maximizes growth. In the model of Saint Paul (1992), it is proven that 
public debt is not the adequate instrument for welfare maximization, but 
investment subsidies. 
 
Aizenman et al. (2007) study the optimal public policy for optimal public 
investment and spending for emerging economies where the tax level can 
inhibit growth, once a certain level is reached. The authors discover that 
countries cannot endure a higher tax level because it lowers the growth rate. 
Also, the reduction in total debt will accelerate GDP growth. The authors 
discover through their model that persistent differences in output might be 
the result of the way in which tax money flows to public spending or 
investment. Having a debt ceiling the government should maintain the GDP 
to debt ratio constant and public spending should be financed only through 
tax increases. 
 
Krugman (1988) has made some theoretical contributions, he defined the 
term “debt overhang”, a context in which a country’s reserve is smaller than 
its debt service. In this situation, the creditors have two possibilities: either 
to continue in supplying credit with a higher expected loss in the hope that 
fundamentals will improve, or accept a lower payment. Krugman (1988) 
shows that this choice can be improved through the addition of a dynamical 
condition, like adjusting the reimbursement condition to the price of a 
market commodity or to international lending rates. 
 
 
Contagion 
 
Contagion is a relatively new concept in the academic literature. The first 
understandings addressed the problematic of emerging economies, more 
specifically, about the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. Bisignano et al. 
(2000) have published a series of speeches and articles presented at a 
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conference sponsored by the World Bank, that were intended to find answers 
and solutions to the Asian crisis. These definitions were the result of worries 
about transnational propagation of financial distress, but the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 showed that contagion is not limited to emerging 
economies, but it first appears inside national borders. 
 
The paper “A Primer on Financial Contagion” by Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) 
considers five possible definitions for contagion: 
1) Contagion is a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one 
country, conditioned by a crisis in another country.  
2) Contagion is present when market volatility heightens from one country 
to another. 
3) Synchronous asset returns from different countries cannot be explained 
by fundamental economic factors. 
4) Contagion is the simultaneous high price movements and high volumes 
of trading in financial markets, given a crisis in one market. 
5) Contagion appears when the transmission channel widens, after a shock 
in one market. 
 
The speed with which contagion propagates is a critical element for 
Kaminsky et al. (2003) who find that a financial distress can spread in 
multiple countries in an interval of days or hours. Studying a large database 
of capital market crises, speculative foreign exchange attacks or sovereign 
state defaults between 1980 and 2000, the authors define the term of “unholy 
trinity”, a set of essential conditions for contagion to appear: an abrupt 
change in capital flows direction, surprise news and a common over indebted 
creditor. 
 
As a first prerequisite contagion builds on accelerate capital inflow and the 
initial shock bursts this temporary bubble. During the second phase, the 
announcement that triggered the chain reaction has to come as a surprise for 
investors. The difference between anticipated and unanticipated ones is 
critical, because rational investors adjust their decisions and portfolios in 
anticipation (Didier, Mauro, & Schmukler, 2008). As a last phase, the over 
indebted creditor (commercial banks, speculative funds, mutual funds, etc.) 
retires from the market under the pressure of its own clients, unable to 
correct the disequilibria created. 
 
For other economists, a change in the correlation between economic 
variables is the key to understanding contagion. Forbes & Rigobon (2002) 
consider that price volatility biases correlation indices if one believes that 
there is a common factor influencing those variables. For example, a shock to 
a market increases volatility, and subsequently the volatility increases the 
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correlation. This is not to be confounded with contagion. The authors suggest 
filtering the volatility and deciding afterwards if the correlation indicates 
contagion or interdependence. Based on this definition, Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) conclude that the devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 and the 
crash of the US capital market in 1987 were not contagious events, even 
though most researchers consider them so. 
 
Other researchers followed this intuition too: Bekaert and Harvey (2003) 
define contagion as an excess of correlation, beyond economic fundamentals. 
Choosing the fundamental factors is up to the analyst along with the model 
calibration that can deterministically explain asset returns. By studying the 
residuals, contagion appears when the correlations expected by the model 
are surpassed. The authors choose as factors the aggregated return of the US 
capital market and a regional aggregated market return. If two different 
markets are integrated for most of the observation period, but the correlation 
index is subject to short jumps during a crisis, then the null hypothesis of lack 
of contagion is rejected. On the other side, if these two markets have as a 
common determinant a regional market index, then the increased correlation 
can be explained by excess volatility. 
 
 
The data 
 
We used data on the probability of default derived from credit default swaps, 
provided by Deutsche Bank Research department. The probabilities were 
derived assuming a recovery rate of 40%. The data represent daily 
observations spanning from the 1st of July 2014 to the 1st of January 2015. 
Bloomberg provided the CDS premiums from which the probabilities are 
derived. For the scope of this paper, we used a dataset on fourteen emerging 
economies that have liberalized financial markets and are present on 
international bond markets. Because the path of the implied probabilities of 
default was not stationary, we continued this study on the first difference of 
each time series.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the data 
Country 
Probability 
variation 
mean 
Probability 
variation 
mean 
Probability 
variation 
kurtosis 
Augmented dickey-
fuller test 
Argentina 0.16% 4.25% 22.751 stationary 
Brazil 0.06% 3.08% 6.331 stationary 
Croatia -0.06% 1.68% 23.226 stationary 
Hungary -0.07% 2.30% 6.382 stationary 
Indonesia -0.08% 3.08% 3.696 stationary 
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Italy 0.04% 4.29% 5.374 stationary 
Portugal -0.05% 4.64% 7.926 stationary 
Russia 0.43% 3.67% 4.932 stationary 
Slovenia -0.13% 3.35% 7.452 stationary 
Spain -0.02% 4.86% 4.727 stationary 
Thailand -0.09% 2.66% 8.757 stationary 
Turkey -0.06% 2.89% 4.956 stationary 
Ukraine 0.28% 2.64% 6.016 stationary 
Venezuela 0.18% 1.56% 3.672 stationary 
 
Jump identification methodology 
 
Identifying jumps in a time series can be done parametrically or non-
parametrically. Non parametrical methods have the advantage of low 
computation time and are less restricted by underlying assumptions: Lee and 
Mykland (2008) use intraday returns as proxies for volatility; Barndorff-
Nielsen et al. (2006) define bi-power variation extendable to a multipower 
level; Andersen et al. (2012) define the concept of realized volatility. 
 
In the parametric field of jump identification one of the first models for asset 
returns was that of Press (1967) in which he proposes a Poisson process with 
constant intensity (jump frequency) and fixed jump size. In Merton (1976) a 
mixing of pure jumps with a diffusion process was considered an answer to 
capturing the continuous and the discrete nature of returns, an intuition that 
was subsequently used by Jorion (1988) to identify jumps in the foreign 
exchange market. Latter on, Chan and Maheu (2002) proposed a model that 
would account for ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) 
effects in the return path and would also explain the residuals, which were 
assumed to be jumps, by an ARMA (auto regressive moving average) process. 
In this paper we will only highlight the equations concerning the jump 
component: 
 
 
 
The probability of observing a jump between periods t-1 and t follows a 
Poisson distribution. The intensity of the process is time varying and has to 
be estimated each period. 
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The intensity itself is modeled by an autoregressive moving average. This 
characteristic allows for mean reversion in the case of irrational or 
unexpected events in the market, or for momentum when traders reach 
consensus and exhibit herding behavior. 
 
 
 
Theta is the jump size which is made to depend asymmetrically on previous 
returns through the function D(Rt-1) which takes the values of zero or one 
for positive or negative past returns respectively.  
 
This paper replaces the returns used in the initial methodology of Chan and 
Maheu (2002) with the first difference of probabilities of default. A visual 
inspection of the series shows that there are no ARCH effects, and statistical 
testing using the Engle test for residual heteroscedasticity confirms this with 
a lack of ARCH effects for 10 of the 14 series, but after filtering the jumps, 
only one series is left with ARCH effects, which motivated me to suppress the 
continuous component of the model, in favor of a pure jump process. 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 3. Total number of co-jumps between countries 
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Brazil 0 39 21 38 62 43 67 71 48 39 24 54 92 96 
Croatia 0 0 28 37 36 33 58 67 25 31 18 45 78 76 
Hungary 0 0 0 28 28 29 36 40 19 23 12 36 48 47 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 32 40 51 55 28 35 12 46 68 63 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 48 68 74 39 40 21 58 86 88 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 65 31 45 17 47 78 76 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92 40 65 21 66 
10
7 114 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 62 22 90 
13
0 128 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 17 39 55 61 
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Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 44 67 68 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 31 33 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10
0 97 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 147 
 
The countries that have the most variable default probabilities are in 
descending order, Venezuela, Ukraine and Russia. It seems that countries 
that are at war or have autocratic regimes are the most feared by 
international investors and therefore, most at risk of default. Countries inside 
the EURO present higher stability. Even if Indonesia is not part of the EURO 
area, its experience of the Asian crisis and the measures it took, makes it a 
much more stable country. Portugal and Italy are the most exposed countries 
to CDS variation, and both react to each other’s financial distress. One 
explanation could be the concentration of the economic activity in specific 
overdeveloped areas, like the banking sector, as studied by Treapăt (2011) 
and Mihalcea and Vițelar (2014). From the matrix above, we can see that 
international creditors cluster their beliefs into groups of countries with 
different risk profiles: high risk (Russia, Venezuela) or low risk (Thailand, 
Hungary, Indonesia). 
 
Table 4. Number of positive co-jumps between countries 
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Brazil 12 3 13 14 12 18 24 12 11 5 19 25 31 
Croatia 0 9 19 8 8 19 30 4 14 7 17 29 31 
Hungary 0 0 9 11 11 14 16 4 11 3 14 18 15 
Indonesia 0 0 0 15 14 16 25 7 14 4 20 22 20 
Italy 0 0 0 0 18 21 28 11 15 7 23 31 22 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 10 17 5 18 26 25 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 11 29 5 22 33 37 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 26 8 42 61 49 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 9 16 17 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 17 23 23 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 9 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 32 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 
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Table 5. Number of negative co-jumps between countries 
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Brazil 12 6 15 26 17 27 19 16 12 12 19 21 31 
Croatia 0 13 13 15 11 20 28 9 6 5 22 25 23 
Hungary 0 0 13 13 10 17 18 9 7 2 15 19 17 
Indonesia 0 0 0 12 15 20 21 14 10 5 18 23 17 
Italy 0 0 0 0 16 31 26 19 14 8 26 24 28 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 34 19 13 23 10 20 24 19 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 23 28 11 28 37 36 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 14 3 34 42 31 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 5 19 16 24 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 14 18 19 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 10 8 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 25 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 
 
Table 6. Number of different sign co-jumps between countries 
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Brazil 15 12 10 22 14 22 28 20 16 7 16 46 34 
Croatia 0 6 5 13 14 19 9 12 11 6 6 24 22 
Hungary 0 0 6 4 8 5 6 6 5 7 7 11 15 
Indonesia 0 0 0 5 11 15 9 7 11 3 8 23 26 
Italy 0 0 0 0 14 16 20 9 11 6 9 31 38 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 7 21 8 5 2 9 28 32 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 6 8 5 16 37 41 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 22 11 14 27 48 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 11 23 20 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 13 26 26 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 11 16 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 40 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 
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Figure 4. Distribution of co-jumps by direction 
 
When simultaneous extreme events appear in the sovereign bond market, 
they tend to have the same direction in 65% of cases. This shows that 
contagion can be inferred in the extreme movement specter. 
 
Figure 5. Correlation index between jumps (left) and between normal 
probability variations 
 
Are extreme movements more correlated than normal ones? The two charts 
above show the histogram of correlations between all the combinations of 
two-pair time series in the dataset. The chart on the left clearly indicates that 
most of the correlation coefficients for extreme movements only have values 
around 0.65 and that the correlation coefficients for normal movements are 
uniformly distributed with a tendency to cluster around the value of zero. 
This means that jumps in CDS or in default probabilities have a different 
behavior than normal movements and indicate the existence of abnormal 
correlation. 
 
35%
35%
30%
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Conclusions 
 
The constant integration of international financial markets has made credit 
more available to sovereign states. Simultaneously, the consolidation of 
sovereignty renders most republics immune to outside coercion in the 
business of honoring their debt payments. These two factors have 
contributed to the multiplication of defaults for governmental debt in the 
past century as investors panic and credit dries up. In the absence of a 
supranational lender of last resort, new models for risk assessment must be 
devised that take into account not only the current capacity of a nation to 
reimburse its debt, but also the impact of investor sentiment regarding its 
credit worthiness and credit availability once panic or exuberance 
overcomes fundamental economics. Contagion needs to be accounted for in 
any macroeconomic forecast because econometric models that are based on 
annual or quarterly data cannot cope with the almost instantaneous 
developments in credit markets and possible multiple equilibrium outcomes, 
once a crisis unfolds. 
 
Investor behavior in international credit markets can be split into two 
different spectrums, business as usual and herding behavior. Whether the 
herding behavior is triggered by consensus, panic or unexpected news, it 
determines the clustering of opinions about certain sovereign state debtors. 
Consequently, the CDS premiums suffer violent corrections of nonlinear 
nature (discontinuous jumps) that are similar in change direction and rarely 
offset each other. Emerging markets with poorly liberalized economies or 
which indicate high political instability are having the most volatile 
probabilities of default. Countries that benefit from the protection of a 
supranational entity like the EU or IMF, or those that have in place prudential 
financial policies, remain unaffected by international turmoil. Given the 
coincidence between the high degree of jump correlation between Russia, 
Ukraine, Venezuela and Turkey and the international setting in the analyzed 
period, we conclude that those countries that are perceived as politically 
unstable or that are subject to international sanctions face not only high 
volatility but also extreme changes in their CDS premiums. This behavior 
could be explained by the effort of markets to reach equilibrium or consensus 
when robust financial analysis based on macroeconomic factors is constantly 
perturbed by news about political unrest. These observations could be used 
by investors to make a profit in the CDS markets because in the case of large 
economies with sound financial indicators, a jump beyond explained 
volatility should be followed by a return to a fundamental equilibrium level 
or by a more extreme movement in the opposite direction. 
 
352 | Vasile MARICA, Lucian ANGHEL 
Sovereign Default Analysis through Extreme Events Identification 
 
 
Jumps in asset returns, foreign exchange rates or CDS spreads can serve as 
an indicator of contagion because by definition, a jump is an unexpected and 
extreme movement. The econometrical framework proposed by Chan and 
Maheu (2002) distinguishes the jump component from the linear movements 
in the time series and from volatility clustering effects therefore isolating that 
movement which cannot be statistically explained. One possible way of 
testing if jump identification can serve as a mean for contagion testing is to 
compare the results of parametrical and non-parametrical jump models 
against the methodology of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) which eliminates the 
volatility bias and has already proved that previous episodes of contagion 
were actually manifestations of interdependence. Because contagion 
between financial markets becomes more rapid as electronic trading and 
news availability increase, jumps might serve as an efficient tool for 
contagion identification because classical correlation analysis loses meaning 
for high frequency time series.  
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